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ECONOMIC, ECOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL RISKS IN
DURBAN’S PORT-PETROCHEMICAL-COAL EXPANSION
Patrick Bond
In Durban, South Africa, the risks associated with economic planning errors – especially the
city’s growing herd of white elephant construction projects – combine with ecological dangers
and social upheaval to generate a potentially explosive situation in coming years. As the South
Durban port’s $25 billion expansion gathers momentum and container traffic rises from recent
levels of 2.5 million per year (Africa’s highest) to a projected 20 million by 2040, social activists
have been establishing lines of argument that pick away at the edges of state-corporate investment
logic. That logic has obvious flaws in terms of rising risk in the shipping industry (especially
with the Agulhas Current continuing to capsize even extremely large vessels), externalization of
costs, overcapacity, inefficiencies and national economic interests. Moreover, the years since
2008 have witnessed a process of ‘deglobalized’ flows of trade and investment, with South Africa
increasingly uncompetitive what with recent credit ratings downgrading certain to lower the
country’s currency value (hence deterring imports) and to raise interest rates, even on trade finance.
In addition, to the extent that Environmental Impact Assessments now include concern about
climate change, a project of this magnitude is both a victim and a villain when it comes to rising
sea levels, extreme storms and ocean acidification. The risks associated with social unrest, especially
as a result of displacement as the back-of-port operations encroach on poor people’s residences,
are compounded by the likelihood of community activists (including this author) embarking upon
‘financial sanctions’ campaigning against corporations (such as Transnet) involved in the port-
petrochemical expansion. Hence a full spectrum of risks now emerges in an era of frenetic
mercantile and fossil fuel activities, in what is already a politically-volatile Durban municipality,
stretching eastwards out into the maritime-volatile but potentially oil-rich Agulhas Current.
Introduction: The Imperatives of Port and Fossil Fuel Expansion
If the anthropology of maritime security has so far been understood mainly in
terms of geo-strategic positioning, fisheries and mitigation of naval attacks, then
major new dimensions of risk associated with port expansions and associated
infrastructure mega-projects may stretch the sub-discipline. Vast new investment
in maritime infrastructure capacity is terribly risky given the paucity of evidence
that containerization can continue at the same rates as in the past, especially what
with climate change and social unrest now rising as major considerations in energy,
transport, production and consumption systems. Those systems have come to rely
upon containers as the most efficient way of packaging commodities for long-
distance transport.
The historic shift of mercantile commerce towards shipping containers was
also an outcome of risk management in the sense that war-time logistics offered
the basis for what came to be world maritime commerce’s primary unit of measure,
472 MAN IN INDIA
the Twentyfoot Equivalent Unit (TEU) metal box. As Deborah Cowen (2014)
observes,
The standard shipping container, another US military innovation, has been repeatedly dubbed
the single most important technological innovation underpinning the globalization of trade.
While shipping containers have a long history of experimentation, the standardization of an
intermodal container that could be transferred across different modes of transport was first
experimented with during World War II as a means to reduce the time and labour involved
in transporting military supplies to the front. It was not until the Vietnam War that the
military use of the shipping container entrenched its standardized global form.
That war was lost by Washington because of a popular liberation movement’s
courage. Although it would be invidious to compare, since there is nothing of the
same intensity, resistance to the contemporary commercial transport system can
be traced at several stages: petroleum extraction and refining, container shipping
expansion, truck freight and warehousing and retail systems. To illustrate, one of
the most extreme sites of the mercantile sector’s vulnerability is also targeted for
one of Africa’s single largest infrastructure expansions. The largest project in Africa
is on the Congo River: the $100 billion Inga Hydropower Project designed to
generate more than 40 000 megaWatts of power, making it three times larger than
the world’s next largest dam, China’s Three Gorges. But that project’s financing
remains in doubt since the host Democratic Republic of the Congo is too unstable
and the surrounding region too vulnerable for long-distance high-tension electricity
power supply routes in the foreseeable future.
In contrast, in South Africa, two major projects are underway that will boost
overall infrastructure spending by several tens of billions of dollars’ worth: the
Strategic Investment Projects 1 and 2 run by the Presidential Infrastructure
Coodinating Commission (PICC). Both involve extensive port expansions, and
both are controversial because of the debatable economics, community displacement
and ecological devastation – especially climate-related – associated with the state-
subsidised projects. The first is the new rail line (plus $4.5 billion in locomotive
purchases) that will bring coal from Limpopo and Mpumalanga Provinces to
Richard’s Bay. The second – the subject of most of this article – is the expansion
of the South Durban Basin’s port and petrochemical complex. In both cases, the
port municipality and parastatal agency Transnet have begun detailed planning,
and both are being contested by environmentalists, with community activists also
opposed to South Durban, as discussed in more detail below.
To demonstrate the global and national priorities associated with South Africa’s
port infrastructure expansion, consider the broad justification offered by President
Jacob Zuma (2014) for the PICC projects:
At the close of the second decade of our democracy, it is clear that we need to change gear.
All South Africans need to work together in a concerted effort to improve service delivery,
bolster job creation and expedite economic transformation. In South Africa, joblessness is
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still unacceptably high even with recent growth in jobs numbers. Global economic prospects
remain fragile. In response, the Government of the Republic of South Africa has taken a
bold decision. We have chosen a path of counter-cyclical spending driven by catalytic
infrastructure investment. We are striking a fine balance between protecting our sovereign
integrity while leveraging the multiplier impact of fixed capital formation. Valuable lessons
have been learned from our most recent build programmes, such as the 2010 World Cup
stadiums, King Shaka International Airport, Medupi Power Station and Gautrain.
In the same spirit, Public Enterprise Minister Malusi Gigaba(2014) – who was in
charge of Transnet from 2009-14 – made claims two weeks before the 7 May 2014
election that after its decisive win (which was nearly 63 per cent of the vote), the
ANC would implement “radical socioeconomic transformation” to make the
economy “a more labour-absorbing one that is characterised by deracialised and
widespread ownership.” Gigaba advocated “local beneficiation and value addition,”
“inclusive and equitable growth”and “millions of sustainable and decent jobs. One
of the levers we are using to restructure the South African economy is infrastructure
investment”of $380 billion.
Likewise, the National Planning Commission’s (2011) Diagnostic report
argued, “South Africa needs to move away from the unsustainable use of natural
resources” and optimistically asserted, “South Africa can manage the transition to
a low-carbon economy at a pace consistent with government’s public pledges,
without harming jobs and competitiveness.” Yet the Commission’s (2012) National
Development Plan endorsement of the PICC SIPs 1 and 2 would, in reality, amplify
that very unsustainability and carbon-intensity. The Plan calls first for “The
construction of a new coal line to unlock coal deposits in the Waterberg, extension
of existing coal lines in the central basin,” and hence a rapid expansion of coal
exports – mostly to India – from the world’s largest export coal terminal, Richards
Bay. In past years, Durban had the honour of exporting the bulk of South African
coal, a process which, shipping journalist Sidney Howard (1936) reported in the
mid-1930s, “helped to make the port of Durban prosperous. The coal is shipped to
East African and Red Sea ports, largely by Union Government vessels, as well as
to other parts of the world… The capacity of the loading plant exceeds 1,000 tons
an hour.”
By the mid-1970s, coal shipments began to be directed to the new deep-water
port at Richards Bay, where the purpose-built Coal Terminal and mechanisation
lifted the rate dramatically. By 2014, Transnet used Richards Bay to run 85 per
cent of its export capacity of 78 million tonnes per year. Still, when Botswana
aimed to annually export more than 100 million tonnes of its vast coal reserves –
an estimated 212 billion tonnes– by developing a rail link to Walvis Bay, in 2013
it began the process at its Debswana joint venture with DeBeers with Indian and
Chinese buyers who loaded at the Durban port.
The odd exception like that aside, during the late 20th century, Durban became
an extremely expensive and inefficient port. By 2012 it was reportedly the world’s
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most costly harbour, with a tariff of $285,000 per average container ship, nearly
five times higher than the world average. Along with Cape Town (just a bit less
expensive), this price was nearly double the next highest, Melbourne (Dyer 2014).
As a result, the second major PICC project would be its modernization: “the
development of the Durban-Gauteng freight corridor, including the development
of a new dug-out port on the site of the old Durban airport” (National Planning
Commission, 2012). The prior work on doubling Transnet’s Durban-Johannesburg
pipeline capacity (at a cost of more than $2 billion) and a few smaller projects
were central to expanding the shipping, freight, and petrochemical industries, in
spite of near universal South Durban community opposition.The vast damage done
by coal and petroleum to local and global ecologies was not acknowledged in
Planning Commission, Transnet or municipal documents, even when repeated
Environmental Impact Assessment challenges were made in 2012-14 by the South
Durban Community Environmental Alliance (SDCEA) (2014), the University of
KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society (Paton 2014) and other Durban
environmentalists.
Finally, by way of background, it is revealing that this kind of port-centric
infrastructure strategy was endorsed by SA Communist Party deputy general
secretary Jeremy Cronin (2013), who enthused over unlocking the northern mineral
belt. Major mining houses have extensive mining licences in the Waterberg region
of Limpopo, one of the poorest regions of our country. There are major coal,
platinum, chrome and other mineral deposits there, but unlocking these resources
for development has been severely restricted by water and energy shortages, and
by the absence of an effective transport infrastructure. Through our major parastatals
(Eskom and Transnet), coordinated by the PICC, we are addressing the energy and
logistics challenges, and through the Department of Water Affairs major dam and
water pipe-line construction is underway. The funding for this public-sector driven
infrastructure will be recouped through user-pay, off-take agreements with the
mines. The mining houses bring investment and technology that government doesn’t
have. Obviously the objective of the mining houses is profits, but in pursuing
profits they create jobs.
As Cronin (2013) continued, “The rail infrastructure that is provided by
Transnet needs to focus not just on maximising exports (which the mining houses
want), but also on connecting coal mining, for instance, more effectively to
beneficiation in the new generation power stations. The state-regulated pricing of
water, electricity and logistics will also need to ensure that our strategic
developmental objectives are leveraged. In particular, we need to ensure that the
towns and cities that grow up around this development do not replicate old patterns,
but are green and integrated.”
Even with sustainability rhetoric added, this ‘development’ narrative – from
the President, Public Enterprise Minister, National Planning Commission and
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Communist Party – confirms South Africa’s ongoing control by what is termed
the Minerals-Energy Complex (Fine and Rustomjee 1996). As one casualty, this
means that no change to status quo climate destroying policies is on the cards
(Bond 2012). Even a few weeks before Durban’s hosting of the United Nations
November 2011 world climate summit, Pretoria’s Climate White Paper also refused
to grapple with fossil fuel addiction. As the national Plan argued, the top priority
for economic growth is to “raise exports, focusing on those areas where South
Africa has the endowments and comparative advantage, such as mining.” Though
this status quo strategy is destructive to economy, society, polity and ecology, it
was unsurprising to see Business Day editor Peter Bruce (2012)– for many, the
leading organic intellectual of SA capital – make the same point without any
distracting sustainability discourse, urging on the state’s promised $100 billion
infrastructure spending in early 2012 with the mantra: “Mine more and faster and
ship what we mine cheaper and faster.”
What is unique about the PICC’s plans for South Durban, is that although the
Basin’s residents include many people (mostly black) with employment and other
commercial links to shipping, freight and petrochemical industries, the extra
pollution in this toxic-saturated ‘armpit of Africa’ has over the past decade catalyzed
extraordinary resistance (Bond 2011, Desai 2002). The resistance is one of several
resistance sites to consider when understanding project risk. Others relate to the
character of maritime security and mega-ship construction in an era of extreme
weather events and climate change’s impact on one of the world’s most volatile
coasts. First, however, consider the risk associated with economic adjustments in
South Africa and the world.
Durban in a Risky National and World Economy
The Durban port is an excellent case site in which to explore multifaceted risk-
taking. As researcher Jack Dyer (2014) points out:
• it accounts for over 70 per cent of trade passing through South Africa’s
ports;
• over 5000 vessels calling per year;
• a total of 2.69 million 20 foot TEU units of container traffic growing at
1.2 per cent in 2013;
• over 6800 containers handled per day, with 44,829,622 tons of general cargo;
• worth over $10 billion per year in terms of direct expenditure in the local
maritime economy and value related activities;.
• most significant port in the Southern Hemisphere and in Africa in terms
of marine-related economic activity;
• comprises a significant part of not just Durban but the South African
economy.
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The national economic context is vital when considering the prospects for
Durban’s increased container turnover traffic from around 2.5 million per annum
in the 2009-13 period to what the National Planning Commission (2012) estimates
will be 20 million by 2040. South Africa’s major economic problem remains the
sustained overaccumulation of capital (Bond 2014). With its major corporations
having the third highest profit rate in the world (IMF 2013) and also, according to
a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey in early 2014, ranking first in the world in
corporate fraud (Hosken 2014), South African capital is rapacious. The long history
of corporate collusion with apartheid could not be erased overnight (Saul and Bond
2014), and as black liberation in 1994 ushered in a “Faustian Pact” (Kasrils 2013)
between the new ruling party and capital, demands by a leading fraction of business
for neoliberal reform were implemented (Bond 2014).This was economically
unwise, for as exchange controls fell, for example, in 2007, an estimated 23 per
cent of GDP was taken offshore in the form of capital flight (Mohammed 2010).
South Africa was left extremely vulnerable to world economic twists and turns.
As the global financial crisis unfolded in 2008-09, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange
lost over half its value within weeks, and The Economist’s risk ranking of South
Africa was worst of 17 emerging market peers, especially due to the current account
deficit, itself driven not mainly by trade deficit but by the negative balance of
payments, as profits and dividends flooded out to the new London financial
headquarters of the country’s largest firms. The foreign debt then soared, from
$25 billion in 1994 to $80 billion in late 2008 to $140 billion by 2014. One reason
for this degree of vulnerability was a series of persistent currency crashes: by more
than 15 per cent within a month-long period on seven separate occasions, in 1996,
1998, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2011 and 2013, the worst record over the last 15 years
experienced in any medium or large country. Another reflection of vulnerability
especially to rising interest rates in defense of the currency, was the excessive
local consumer credit expansion, a large part of which was based upon mortgage
bonds, given South Africa’s world-leading real estate bubble (389 per cent larger
in 2008 than in 1997, double the height of second place Ireland’s bubble). Internally,
domestic state borrowing was kept under control, and although the decline in
corporate tax revenue drove the budget deficit to a near-record 7.6 per cent of
GDP in 2009 and a bit less in 2010, South Africa was not pursuinga classical
Keynesian strategy. The state was instead carrying through with massive and usually
irrational mega-construction projects contracted years earlier, especially the World
Cup stadiums and elite transport infrastructure such as the new Durban airport and
the Gauteng fast train and highway e-toll upgrade (Bond 2014).
In this dismal macro-economic context, the most successful sectors were
communications, construction and finance while labour-intensive sectors such as
textiles, footwear, and gold-mining shrunk. Overall manufacturing also fell as a
per centage of GDP, and there appeared no incentive to reach out to the growing
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black working class market, but instead to surrender cheap production of basic
goods – clothing, textiles, appliances, electronics, etc – to East Asian imports,
mostly through Durban’s port. The Gini coefficient measuring inequality rose after
1994, and this was racialised, as black households lost and whites won. One reason
was the widespread casualisation of labour and the decline of labour’s share of the
social surplus, while another was that total unemployment rose to a rate of around
40 per cent at peak (if those who have given up looking for work are counted;
otherwisearound 25 per cent, and just 6 per cent for whites) (Bond 2014).
Environmentally, the depletion of non-renewable resources was formidable, and
so was pollution. The economists’ favourite measure of well-being, GDP, should
be adjusted to account for these two factors (amongst others), because GDP only
considers mining activity as a positive increase eachyear, instead of factoring in
mineral depletion, i.e., a country’s decline in natural capital. If those corrections
are made, South Africa would have a net negative per person rate of national
wealth accumulation of US$245 per year (for 2005), according to the World Bank
(2011). In other words, South Africans are growing poorer all the time, the more
the country is stripped of minerals.
In Durban, aside from very strong ethnic links to the ruling faction of the
African National Congress (ANC), the political rulers have little beyond tokenistic
social grants to offer its 3.5 million residents, of whom more than a quarter live on
the very margins of life, in shacks. ANC patronage to major and minor construction
companies and other semi-privatised municipal tendering (home building, bus
services, etc) has created a small wealthy elite whose performance has been subject
to ridicule (the names Mpisanes, Jay Singh, Roy Moodley, Willy Govender, Vivien
Reddy, Andrzej Kiepiela, Roy Moodley and Carver Media, for example, all reflect
various scandals). The former mayor, Obed Mlaba, was named in an official Durban
municipal corruption commission, the 2013 Manase Report, as having hijacked a
$300 million tender for waste incineration, yet national ANC rulers soon named
him the country’s High Commissioner to Britain. The city’s ruling economic elites
have just as dirty roots in apartheid profits, especially the sugar barons who land-
grabbed the coast and abused indentured Indian labour, as well as shipping magnates
and the tourism industry. But Durban never bragged of a strong organic
manufacturing bourgeoisie, although there are several major production sites like
Toyota automobiles, the petrochemical complex and a manganese smelter. The
city’s status in both manufacturing and the country’s fastest-growing sectors, finance
and communications, is merely as branch-plant town. As a result of these ruling-
class characteristics, Durban would never be the kind of city that could shape its
own future.
As a result, most municipal economic development efforts entailed crafting a
marketing strategy based upon sports tourism and convention centre activity
(Durban has Africa’s largest hall), as well as a strong patronage impulse within the
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ruling party, which together generated high-profile white elephant projects. These
include a new $390 million stadium built next to a perfectly good stadium for the
2010 World Cup; high annual subsidies to that stadium, the convention centre and
the uShaka Marine World entertainment site; and a new airport 40 kilometers north
of the city that operates at a fraction of its promised capacity, with unfulfilled
fantasies of an “aerotropolis” development at the Dube Trade Port. It was no surprise
for Toyota South Africa CEO Johan van Zylto announce, “Durban as a brand is
not strong enough to simply say ‘come and invest in Durban’. What it needs to
attract investors are big projects. Durban needs to keep ahead of the competition.
China is building ports they don’t even know when they will use. If return on
investment is the line of thinking we may never see the infrastructure” (Naidoo
2012).
Yet there is great risk associated with reliance upon the maritime sector, tourism
and commodity exports, as the globalised economy begins what may become known
as a 1930s-style “deglobalisation” era. As The Economist (2013, 1) argued in
October 2013 in its cover story entitled “The Gated Globe”,
Globalization has clearly paused. A simple measure of trade intensity, world exports as a
share of world GDP, rose steadily from 1986 to 2008 but has been flat since. Global capital
flows, which in 2007 topped $11 trillion, amounted to barely a third of that figure last year.
Cross-border direct investment is also well down on its 2007 peak… hidden protectionism
is flourishing, often under the guise of export promotion or industrial policy.
The pause button will no doubt be lifted. Yet in what was otherwise a celebration
of global flows, the consulting firm McKinsey Global Institute (2014, 5) also
acknowledged that a peak had been reached in 2007 with $29.3 trillion worth of
flows – 52 per cent of world GDP – which then sunk substantially in relative terms
over the subsequent five years, to just 36 per cent: “This reflects the correction
from the global credit bubble and deleveraging of the financial system. Financial
flows have changed direction, too, with outflows from emerging markets rising
from 7 per cent of the global total in 1990 to 38 per cent in 2012.” Beginning in
May 2013, investors roiled South Africa and four other major emerging markets
when the US Federal Reserve’s Quantitative Easing began to be phased out
(“tapered”). As a result of US interest rates slightly higher, outflows meant that
four of the five “BRICS” – South Africa, India, Brazil and Russia (which suffered
again in early 2014 from financial sanctions imposed after its Crimea invasion) –
suffered substantial currency crashes that, in turn, would limit import capacity.
Even China’s property bubble burst in the 44 largest cities by 19 per cent in the
year between April 2013 and 2014 (Wall Street Journal, 2014). Because of the
turmoil in BRICS, Indonesia, Turkey and similar sites, it is wise to recall the United
Nations (2013, 32) warning, that the world’s financial markets aim to shift “high-
risk activities from more to less strictly regulated environments,” especially sites
where massive state-subsidized and guaranteed infrastructure projects are envisaged.
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In these sites, including the BRICS, both borrower and lender are facing intense
levels of desperation: to sink excess funds into new mega-projects on behalf of
multinational capital. Durban’s port-petrochemical expansion is a fine example of
the high degree of economic risk involved, in part given what awaits in the nearby
waters.
Risks in Riding and Drilling the ‘Remarkably Stable’ (sic) Agulhas Current
Seeking to locate India in 1497, as had Christopher Columbus before being
redirected westward five years earlier, Vasco da Gama arrived at what is now
assumed to be the Durban harbour, and as it was Christmas, he named it Natal. Not
even stopping to alight, he rapidly proceeded up the coast, but names are sticky.
The area he glanced at in transit during those weeks fighting the Agulhas Current
is today known as KwaZulu-Natal Province and the natural port he might have
seen over the sandbar then blocking the entrance –dug out to take in large ships
only in the 1880s – is Durban’s harbor. The city was named after a governor of the
Cape Colony, William D’Urban, once white English-speaking settlers drove King
Shaka’s forces off the land and established a borough in 1835; while the
metropolitan area was renamed Ethekwini 160 years later, Durban is the core city.
Although it was South Africa’s leading port by the early 20th century as the
sugar industry began exporting in earnest, Durban’s waters were never easy to
navigate. The Natal Pulse races down the Agulhas Current a half-dozen times each
year, pushing 20km per day. It is the main reason Durban’s coastline hosts more
than 50 major ship carcasses. In 1909, one notable victim of mega-waves reaching
9 meters was the Waratah, which sunk 180 miles south of Durban (en route to
Cape Town) on 27 July with 211 passengers and crew, leaving no survivors or
sign of the wreck. The ship was one of the world’s largest at 142 meters in length
and 16 000 gross tonnes. Indeed, the Pulse contributes to waves that have sunk
1000 more vessels off the Transkei Wild Coast. Susan Casey’s (2010) book The
Wave: In Pursuit of the Oceans’ Greatest Furies pays Agulhas this respect: “Crude,
diesel, jet fuel, liquefied natural gas: oil in all its forms was heartbreaking, infuriating
and all-too-common sight in the ocean. Supertankers, behemoths that couldn’t
make it through the Suez Canal, swung down from the Middle East, took their
chances hopping a ride in the Agulhas, and met their share of disasters. Salvagers
used every tool at their disposal to prevent the damaged tankers from gushing out
their contents, especially in fragile near-shore environments, but sometimes the
battle was lost.”
The near shore at South Durban is a critical site for not just shipping accidents
but other oil spills. In 2004, just offshore South Durban’s Cuttings Beach, there
was a significant spill of five tons at the Single Buoy Mooring, the 50-meter deep
intake pump that feeds the refineries with 80 per cent of SA’s crude oil imports.
Onshore, corporate pollution standards are so lax that the South Durban refineries
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regularly spring disastrous leaks and explode, sometimes merely from lightning
strikes. Daily, poisons are flared onto thousands of neighbouring residents. The
Indian, coloured and African communities suffer the world’s highest-ever recorded
asthma rate in a school (52 per cent of kids), as Settlers Primary sits next to the
country’s largest paper mill (Mondi) and between two refineries: one run by Engen,
Chevron and Total; and the other, called Sapref, combines BP, Shell and Thebe
Investments. Sapref’s worst leak so far was 1.5 million liters into the Bluff Nature
Reserve and adjoining residences in 2001. Together these refineries can process
300,000 barrels of oil a day, more than any other single site in Sub-Saharan Africa.
But it is when extreme weather combines with destructive oil shipping that
risk amplifies. As just one example of the rogue waves that periodically arise, a
swell of more than 20 meters caused by a southwesterly gale sunk a major oil
tanker, the World Glory, on 13 June 1968. That ship, heading from Kuwait to
Spain, took the hit 65 miles east-northeast of Durban and after two hours had
drifted 40 miles further through the Southeast current, eventually spilling its 334,043
barrels of crude oil. Two dozen of the 34 crew lost their lives. Time magazine
(1954) reported that when launched in February 1954, World Glory was the world’s
largest tanker, “with a capacity of 16.5 million gallons, enough to fill 2,062 railroad
tank cars.”
In recent years, major storms have worsened. Just offshore Durban on 26 July
2011, the 40-year old MT Phoenix oil tanker was hit by six-meter high waves. It
lost its anchor mooring and drifted 25 km north in the main Agulhas eddy, landing
on the rocky shoreline in Christmas Bay. The ship was wrecked at the heart of a
beautiful – albeit class/race-segregated tourist and retirement site – on Durban’s
North Coast. Two weeks earlier, the same beach held an Association of Surfing
Professionals (ASP) world competition, Mr Price Pro, which boasted some of the
best waves ever seen in ASP history, contestants testified. The Agulhas Current is
the second most volatile in the world, with a 5 knot speed at peak, but is most
intense in the July-September months, to the delight of surfers who can find world-
class tube waves in which to perform the barrels through which the highest scores
are achieved.
The winter swells arose just when MT Phoenix was being towed into Durban
harbour for confiscation, having lost its engines a few hundred miles down the
coast. According to Cathleen Jacka(2011) of the maritimematters.net website, the
incident confounded the South African Maritime Safety Authority (Samsa), what
“with hints at a deliberate beaching; the possibility of a mystery stowaway still
hiding onboard; uncertainty as to the true identity of the owners and even that the
vessel was scrapped in India last year.” A Samsa official observed that the 15-
member crew “seemed inexperienced in the basic actions required to stabilise the
vessel’s position” and remarked, “It would not be the first time that an unscrupulous
ship owner was prepared to sacrifice a vessel in attempting to realise the insured
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value”. There was apparently no insurance for the MT Phoenix, since Lloyds had
removed it from the books the year before and allegedly it was on its final trip,
from West Africa to India’s ship-breaking graveyard. The owner, Suhair Khan of
Dubai, stopped taking calls, leaving South Africans to bear the risk of 400 tons of
oil spilling if the ship broke on the rocks. Estimates of the heroic rescue operation’s
cost to the taxpayer easily run into the millions of dollars, but at least the crew was
saved and oil was laboriously pumped ashore (Jacka 2011).
Just weeks before, in May 2011, the Petroleum Agency of SA (PetroSA) began
authorizing seismic oil surveying in the same area. The initial applicant, followed
by Sasol and ExxonMobil, was Silver Wave Energy, a Singapore-registered
company whose owner is Burmese businessman Min Min Aung, a close associate
of the junta that still rules Myanmar. The Burmese connection is important, in part
because exploitation of oil and gas in the Andaman Sea has long been controversial.
When Unocal – now Chevron – built a pipeline to Thailand, it did such enormous
damage to people and the environment that local villagers, supported by Earthrights
International, successfully sued the firm for $30 million. Since 2007 the Arakan
islands on Burma’s Bay of Bengal coast have been the main site of intense conflict,
as Jockai Khaing from Arakan Oil Watch has revealed, and again Aung is a key
player. Silver Wave has also been exploring dubious extraction projects in Russia,
Sudan, Guinea-Conakry, Indonesia and Iraq, but in spite of sanctions against Burma
at the time, Aung received PetroSA’s endorsement to explore 8000 square km
stretching from Durban to Richards Bay. Silver Wave’s permission extends from
30 meters out into the ocean, to depths of 2 kilometers, while ExxonMobil’s goes
as deep as 3.5 kilometers. By comparison, BP’s Deepwater Horizon platform in
the much calmer Gulf of Mexico drilled 1.5 km down to the seafloor surface.Sasol’s
oil drilling is also contentions; it is the former state-owned company (privatized in
1979 and subsequently co-listed on the New York Stock Exchange) repeatedly
fined for pollution, with a Secunda synthetic fuel (coal/gas-to-oil) operation that is
considered the single largest point-source of CO2 emissions in the world.
As if to demonstrate that a company like Silver Wave (2011) is a high risk, its
own Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) filing to explore for oil includes
this prose: “Compared to other western boundary currents the Agulhas Current
adjacent to southern Africa’s East Coast exhibits a remarkable stability.” Still today,
large ships continue to founder off the KwaZulu-Natal coastline. One winter day,
19 August 2013, the China-bound MV Smart tried to exit the port of Richards Bay
in ten-meter waves with a load of nearly 150 000 tons of coal and 1 800 tons of oil.
The huge vessel split after grounding on a sandbank at the entrance to the world’s
largest coal export site. Three tugboats failed to dislodge the boat (Rawlins 2013),
after “the slamming of the vessel’s stern on the seabed while encountering
exceptional swell,” according to Greek owner NG Moundreas (van der Sandt, 2013).
Environmentalists accused the captain and harbor master of negligence for allowing
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the ship to sail under those conditions; the impact of an oil spill of that magnitude
could have been devastating to the fragile ecosystem around Richards Bay. Once
the oil was pumped safely off, local port officials agreed to Moundreas’ dumping
of nearly all the coal into the Richards Bay harbor, so as to tow the broken-backed
Panama-registered ship 70km out to sea for sinking. The project was of great concern
to the Department of Environmental Affairs, whose spokesperson Zolile Nqayi
worried that “the vessel may break up eventually, sink there, and we will have to
close off the port. That may be devastating for the area” (Lancaster 2013), including
sensitive nearby estuary sites such as the uMfolozi, uMlalazi and the uMlhathuze
Sanctuary.
Although in that case, the sinking didn’t occur within Richards Bay, the local
shipping industry appeared ill-prepared for extreme weather and “monster waves”.
This is a global problem, as insurance expert Sven Gerhard of Allianz Global
Corporate and Specialty explained in 2014: “The claims arising out of maritime
emergencies of these ‘mega ships’ can be huge,” in part because – as MV Smart
showed – there is “risk of such vessels blocking port and terminal accesses”; as
well as enormous costs of “salvage operations to recover ship and cargo when
accidents occurred” (Fairplay 2014).
The largest of the mega-ships are container vessels which now regularly carry
more than 10 000 TEUs. In 2013 alone, the Danish firm Maersk commissioned
seven ships, each 400 meters long and 60 meters wide and 16 meters deep below
the waterline, that can carry 17 000 containers. In 2015, China Shipping and United
Arab Shipping Company will begin sailing 480-meter long Hyundai ships that
carry 18 400 containers. And there will be more built with 24 000 container capacity
by 2016, mainly in South Korea. These are known as “super post-Panamax”, in
that the Panama Canal’s limits allow 5 000. The $5.5 billion dig to deepen and
widen the canal by 2015 will not deter a $40 billion Chinese-funded competitor in
nearby Nicaragua. Most harbours are following suit.
The severe economic risk associated with these ships, however, is akin to
many aspects of capitalist overproduction; overcapacity is associated with larger
ships on the East-West route, then cascading to smaller ports through hand-me-
down post-Panamax ships of only 12 000 TEU capacity. According to Andrew
Penfold of Ocean Shipping Consultants, “Ports and terminals, especially in the
north-south trades, are being asked to handle ships which would have appeared to
be totally out of scale with the demands of the trade – that’s not because the shipping
lines are being careful with where they put their ships, but because they’ve got so
many of them, there’s nothing else they can do with them.” Economies of scale in
the shift from ships carrying 16 000 TEUs to 24 000 TEUs saves 17 per cent per
container ($10 per unit per day at sea is the target).According toPenfold, “Despite
the wounds of overcapacity, further ordering off even larger vessels seems
inevitable” (International Shipping News 2014). Other savings come in the form
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of labour; Walmart’s 2011 purchase of the Maersk 18 000 TEU capacity ships for
its trans-Pacific route (four days from China to California full, and the ship returns
empty to reload) allows it to hire merely 13 to 19 crew (Martin 2011).
Under the pressures of globalization, containerization and mechanization, ports
like Durban will then be compelled to install new gantry cranes to unload containers
four at a time. But as Transnet’s 2013 installation of seven Chinese cranes costing
$65 million showed, design specifications are critical because these now lift not
four but only two at a time. Ports are also being pressured to service much larger
boats by dredging their harbour entrances deeper; by 2013 the 12 500 TEU boats
could only enter and exit Durban at high tide and half-full, even after a major
widening and deepening operation. Other requirements are the expanded size of
berths to accommodate longer ships, and longer (and stronger) quay walls. The
expansion of Durban’s Berths 203-205 reflects these additional requirements,
Transnet claims. But South Africa’s leading maritime journalist, Terry Hutson
(2014), disagrees, and questioned Transnet’s economic logic in early 2014: “In
Durban there is little likelihood of any big growth in volumes in the near future. A
few years ago, the port went backwards in the number of containers it handled,
dropping something like 200 000 TEU in a year and there has been little growth
since… So the questions remain: Does Durban need the deeper berths and aren’t
the bigger ships premature?”
Climate Risk when Transnet is Both Victim and Villain
One factor persistently eluded Transnet in its port expansion advocacy and
planning: climate change. As shown in a 2012-14 debate between community
critics and Transnet’s environmental consultants – initially adjudicated in the
former’s favour by the national government regulator – the extreme weather and
rising sea levels that can be expected in coming decades allow a new climate
narrative to emerge as part of resisting the port-petrochemical expansion. Disputes
date to the first recent stage of major Transnet spending, the oil pipeline’s doubled
capacity starting in 2006. By 2008, SDCEA had utilized the climate narrative
vigorously, both to highlight damage done to South Durban by climate change,
and to consider the damage to the earth done by South Durban industries. That
pipeline, originally estimated to cost $600 million, increased to $2.34 billion by
2014. Collusion in the tendering process by major construction companies was
one reason (Venter 2013). But there were other telling reasons, too, as the main
politician then responsible for Transnet, Public Enterprises Minister Malusi
Gigaba (2012), concluded after a review. Amongst “systemic failings that
compromised the intended outcomes”were project managers who “lacked
sufficient capacity and depth of experience.” He pointed out that “analysis of
risks” was weak and that EIAs and water and wetland permits were not “pursued
with sufficient foresight and vigour.”
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The critique by SDCEA (2008) of the oil pipeline EIA reflected concerns
about local environmental injustices and the race-class combination of biases
associated with rerouting the pipeline to black areas from wealth white areas. But
in addition, SDCEA observed that there was relevance in the Kyoto Protocol, which
as Transnet put it, “commits a country to quantified emissions limitations and
reductions.” As SDCEA (2008) claimed, “the rise of CO2 emissions that will be
facilitated by the pipeline is immense, and is only referred to in the Draft Scoping
Report as a potential legal problem, with no details provided.” And SDCEA (2008)
pointed out many other aspects of pipeline and refinery mismanagement in South
Durban, including the health of the port itself: “Durban Bay, in which the harbour
is situated, is struggling to cope with the pollution loads from harbour and associated
activities, contaminated riverine and storm-water inflows. The expansion will
require further removal of aspects of the Bay’s ecosystem, which will in turn further
reduce the assimilative capacity of this threatened and fragile estuary.”
These objections neither changed Transnet’s mind nor slowed the EIA process,
even though a risk warning was provided on 19 March 2007. According to marine
expert Andrew Mather (2007), a massive storm hit Durban that day: “wave run-up
heights were measured at twelve beaches along the Durban and Ballito coastline
and these peaked at 10.57 meters above Mean Sea Level.” But having successfully
ignored ecological problems caused by the pipeline, the next stage for Transnet
was downplaying climate change associated with the first stage of the port’s
expansion, in a 2012-14 EIA process. Yet by then, even the Ethekwini metro
municipality’s (2009) own Municipal Adaptation Plan had, in late 2009, identified
a series of vulnerabilities to the harbour:
cyclones are projected to track further south down the Mozambique Channel increasing the
likelihood that severe storms will occur in the Durban region… roads, bridges, railway
lines, storm water and sewerage pipes as well as beachfront property could be washed
away… Disruption to serves at the Port of Durban (e.g. damaged cranes and ships) could
have short to medium term impact on a wide range of businesses, organisations and activities.
High winds disrupt the entry of ships to the Durban harbor and prevent the operation of
port-side cranes.
The climate report done by Transnet (2012) via its consultants ZAA was revealing,
with Transnet in both a victim and villain role. As for the latter, Transnet’s failure
to incorporate trends in global climate negotiations meant that even the official
statement from the 2011 United Nations climate summit – the ‘Durban Platform’ –
was ignored, insofar as that process will erase differences between Annex 1 and 2
countries, hence drawing South Africa into formal obligations at the 2015 Paris
climate summit. Those obligations will probably include emissions cuts in shipping
and bunker fuel consumption, just as airline emissions cuts began to be mandated
by the European Unionin 2012.The South African government’s (2010) own climate
green paper noted the growing “reluctance to trade in goods with a high carbon
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footprint.” The carbon tax announced in 2013 would inevitably apply to shipping,
given current trends to incorporate maritime activities – but again was ignored by
Transnet (2013). In addition, when it came to mitigation, Transnet (2013) made
another revealing argument: the vast expansion in shipping that the capacity
expansion will facilitate could lead to lower CO2e emissions. Transnet’s (2012)
Nemai consultants claimed that the economies of scale associated with post-
Panamax shipping would be decisive: “The project will decrease the ship waiting
and turnaround times which will have a lower carbon impact” – not realizing that
if efficiency is increased by reducing the ships’ offshore wait, this increases their
ability to load, unload and hence raise emissions.
As for Transnet as victim, the desire to build the $380 million first stage of the
project as quickly as possible, thereby raising annual container processing capacity
from around 2.8 million to 5 million, led to an apparent case of climate denialism.
One government researcher – the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research’s
Roy Van Ballegooyen (Transnet 2012) – working for Transnet entirely ignored
climate in his “Modelling of potential environmental change in the port marine
environment” report. After being repeatedly challenged on climate, Transnet’s
(2013) formal EIA then resorted to using 2008-and-earlier information, especially
about the impact of sea level rise (SLR):
The probability of sudden large rises in sea level (possibly several metres) due to catastrophic
failure of large iceshelves is considered unlikely this century… In 2008, the UN’s expert
scientific body on climate change projected that the sea level around the world could rise
from anywhere between 180 mm and 580 mm by the end of this century as result of rising
ocean temperatures and the melting of glaciers, snow and ice in polar regions.
That EIA report was rejected by the Department of Environmental Affairs as
inadequate on two counts: the Durban harbour’s sensitive sandbank would be
partially destroyed, nor was climate properly considered (Paton 2014). But in its
mid-2014 update, Transnet (2014) and its consultants demonstrated an
unwillingness to change, misreading a report by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) (2013) to still maintain a maximum 0.58 meters of SLR
within 45 years, the berth upgrade’s lifespan. As SDCEA (2014) pointed out in
great detail in their EIA critique, this is a disturbing underestimate of the problem
as it will affect Durban. There are two reasons: the IPCC actually estimated a
higher SLR figure than the Transnet consultants identified; and in any case the
IPCC is persistently too optimistic about climate impacts (typically by 60 per cent),
and hence more updated scientific literature was required. Columbia University’s
Earth Institute (2013) projected in 2013 “sea-level rise of as much as six feet (1.83m)
globally instead of two to three feet” by 2100, with higher amounts (3m) possible
if more giant ice sheets crack. In May 2014, weeks before Transnet’s (2014) updated
filing, scientists calculated the West Antarctic ice sheet’s more rapid submersion
and generated much higher SLR estimates.
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In addition to SLR and ocean acidification, at least four basic concerns remain,
which Transnet failed to answer in its EIA statements:
• by expanding the shipping capacity of Durban harbour to super post-
Panamax scale container vessels, will Transnet take up excessive amounts
of South Africa’s carbon budget and therefore ruin the government’s pledge
to peak and then decrease emissions after 2020?;
• expanding the shipping capacity also requires expanding the freight
capacity, the danger is that more emissions, congestion, and trucking-
related accidents will occur in an area demonstrably unsuitable given lack
of road transport and inadequate shifting of freight to rail, so it is critical
to know the amount of the new freight capacity being built to handle the
much larger shipping capacity – i.e., what proportion of this is being
anticipated for freight haulage by rail and by trucking respectively?
• has the recommendation by the Academy of Sciences of South Africa, in
its 2011 book Towards a Low Carbon City, commissioned by the city,
been incorporated? “The transport sector is pivotal to the transition to a
low carbon city... The top priority was identified as the need to reduce the
vehicle kilometers travelled in the road freight sector as this provided the
greatest opportunity to simultaneously reduce emissions of GreenHouse
Gases and traditional air pollutants.”
• how much additional CO2 will be emitted by the bunker fuel that is
consumed by ships en route to and from Durban as a result of the vast new
capacity associated with super post-Panamax ships soon capable of entering
the Durban harbor, and how much additional CO2 will be emitted by the
trucks that will haul the new freight, assuming this expansion is the crucial
link in raising capacity to 5 million containers annually?
Conclusion: The Risks of Resistance, and of Activists Connecting the Dots
Few if any of the risks discussed in this article can provide any genuine, lasting
deterrent without social agency. Vast parastatal corporations and the for-profit
corporations they serve can easily turn their backs on even the most glaring
contradictions, as Transnet demonstrated in repeated EIAs when faced with climate-
related objections to the South Durban port-petrochemical expansion. The threat
climate change represents to our future survival was, for Transnet and its consultants,
merely an opportunity to file repeated arguments representing denialism.
The greatest risk to Durban’sproposed port-petrochemical complex expansion
is the repertoire of mandatory tools in any activist’s toolbox: popular education,
democratic decision-making, mass-based organization, linkages of people
across interest areas leading to new alliances, unity of purpose, an ability to
transcend divisions, powerful analysis, fluidity and pragmatism combined with a
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profound commitment to eco-social justice principles, and effective strategies and
tactics.
There is not sufficient space to do more than reveal some of the discourses
being developed in 2011-14 in South Durban by SDCEA activists and their allies.
One risk that Transnet and major oil companies – even ExxonMobil – face is that
the critical narrative catches on in the broader society, and affects the way we
think about infrastructure priorities. The timing is propitious, because for at least
two decades, South Africa has witnessed what are probably the most prolific protests
in the world dedicated to improved “service delivery” – i.e. demonstrations against
lack of (or excessively expensive) water and sanitation, electricity, housing, clinics,
schools, roads and the like). These have occurred in South Durban, but as ever, the
challenge is linking people’s immediate concerns to wider matters, i.e. to connect
the dots between local and global and back again, and between economic, social
and ecological matters.
SDCEA’s activists were motivated by a variety of minor victories against
polluting industries. In two cases, substantial landfills that were used as toxic dumps
by unethical waste companies were shut down. SDCEA leaders of those campaigns,
Bobby Peek and Desmond D’Sa, were successful in 1996 (Umlazi) and 2012
(Chatsworth), respectfully, and in each case they won the Goldman Environmental
Prize for Africa two years later as a result. SDCEA recorded other victories, notably
against the Engen and Sapref refineries which are collectively the largest refinery
zone in Africa. Because of SDCEA lobbying, they both installed SO2scrubbers so
South Durban is not nearly as thick with airborne pollution and the sickly-sweet
smells of chemical emissions.
SDCEA’s own strength ebbs and flows, as does any civil society institution
fighting injustices where the adverse balance of forces is so glaring. In an earlier
stage of opposition to the port-petrochemical expansion, in 2004-05, SDCEA
gathered thousands of residents to halt a major link road planned from the city’s
main southern freeway to the port. In 2006 SDCEA began campaigning against
the doubling of the oil pipeline capacity and its rerouting through South Durban.
In 2008, SDCEA used the EIA to challenge the climate implications of a major
project for the first time. But at that stage, neither protests nor allegations (quite
valid) of environmental racism nor EIA interventions slowed Transnet; Gigaba
(2012) openly admitted the roughshod way Transnet treated such contestation led
to numerous problems in the pipeline’s implementation.
In 2011, Durban municipal City Manager Mike Sutcliffe – perhaps the city’s
most controversial leader in history (Bond 2011) – drew up a secret plan, estimated
to cost the equivalent of $25 billion, for the entire South Durban Basin. The plan
reflected many decades of official ambition to re-engineer the Basin, in the wake
of the 1940s-60s attacks on black residents which turned South Durban communities
into racial enclaves. Racial settlement patterns existed nearly entirely enchanged
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into the second decade of democracy, with the exception of Clairwood’s
desegregation by shack settlers as urban blighting began in the 1990s. Sutcliffe’s
master plan was only unveiled to the public in mid-2012 at which point a half-
dozen community meetings called by the city under the rubric of public participation
were taken over by SDCEA activists, led by D’Sa. A near unanimous sentiment
was expressed in meeting after meeting: close down the event and refuse to have it
declared a form of tick-off participation. The main planner, consultant Graham
Muller, was repeatedly frustrated.
The narrative in the August 2012 pamphlet, “ACT NOW! EXPANDING
PORT, POLLUTION AND FREIGHT THREATEN SOUTH DURBAN” is worthy
of even brief consideration because, like a poster for a March 2014 SDCEA protest
at Durban’s City Hall, it helps reveal activist attempts to link issues and
constituencies. The first of eight SDCEA critiques in the pamphlet was that “We
need one planning process. The municipality refuses to discuss the port expansion
projects, which are spear-headed by Transnet.” The city’s strategy was to join
Transnet in fragmenting the long 2014-2040 process of approval, construction and
operation so that the vast implications for the entire project are not collected in any
single moment of opposition. In reply, SDCEA demanded “a single participation
process with all spheres of government, developers and communities to chart a
sustainable and common way forward. Otherwise we will be arguing one puzzle
piece at a time and will never change the overall picture.”
The second critique was “Cost vs. Benefit… Proponents boast 130 000
permanent jobs will be created – is this accurate? If correct this means a high
capital investment of $190 000/job created. What other ways could this money be
invested to create sustainable livelihoods without the terrible social and
environmental impacts? Are the full costs – including community destruction,
adverse health effects, and our greater contribution to climate change – being
considered?” Activists suspected the jobs calculation was far out of touch with
reality given, as noted earlier, that even the largest container ships are designed to
have crew numbering less than two dozen (13 in the case of Walmart’s 15 500-
TEU China-California shuttle).
The third critique also questioned the planners’ understanding of global
shipping demand: “Is the expansion justified? Transnet are arguing expansion based
on projections for the growth in container handling. At an 8 per cent growth rate
their projections show that a capacity of only 12 million containers will be needed
by 2040 – yet they are building capacity for 20 million. Is this growth rate attainable
given competition from other ports, growing resource constraints, carbon taxes on
shipping, and global economic collapse?” Activists pointed out that harbour efficiency
was appalling and that Durban’s notorious status of world’s highest-cost port would
not be changed by adding $25 billion in capital costs given high interest rates affecting
repayment of loans plus high operating and maintenance costs.
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The fourth critique was that “Increased containers mean increased impacts,”
and that this would translate into “8x the traffic, pollution and noise… There will
also be an increase in Port related illegal activity including smuggling, drug
trafficking, prostitution and shebeens” (informal pubs).
The fifth was of the “wrong fossil fuel development model. Port expansion
will serve increased imports of consumer goods (60 per cent of container cargo are
imports to Gauteng), expansion of petro-chemical industries & fuel storage and
the automotive industry (Toyota). This does not take into account dwindling
resources, especially oil, and the need to stop climate change.”
The sixth was the environmental risk: “In addition to increasing climate change,
port expansion will increase large water areas within the south Durban flood plain
while removing the last natural wetlands. Toxic industry is also expanding in the
basin. This increases the potential for flooding and hazardous chemical spills as
extreme weather events increase.” Moreover, “the Bay’s estuarine ecosystem has
been compromised to the point that it has lost resilience… The Bay provides a
critical breeding ground for reef associated and migratory marine fish. 132 species
of birds are found here and 62 species of endangered, migratory birds rest and feed
here.”The sandbank’s destruction in the first phase would wreck any remaining
chance of restoring the harbour’s ecological integrity.
The seventh was the resulting “Community upheaval... Clairwood is earmarked
for rezoning to logistics with some light industry. 6000+ people will be forced to
relocate through market pressure, and with no active community present will
inevitably result in the degeneration of historic cultural sites in the area. The port
expansion requires 878 hectares of land for containers!”
The eighth critique was to ask, “Freight – rail or road?The documents make
reference to rail and interchange nodes. However, the documents refer to ‘freight
routes’ which on some plans are shown as rail but more recently as roads.” Just
over a year later, on the Field’s Hill slope through the main mountain pass towards
Durban, 24 people were killed by a runaway truck carrying a container belonging
to Taiwanese-based shipping behemoth Evergreen. It was being freighted from
Johannesburg by a small Durban truck transport agency, which skimped on paying
toll fees (staying on the main highway with its more gradual slope would have cost
$4 more), hired as a driver a low-paid Swazi national with an illegitimate license,
and failed to have its faulty brakes repaired before the fatal trip. The SDCEA
‘truck off’ protest of 500 residents on the freight area’s main throughway (Solomon
Mhlangu Drive) in March 2012 had forewarned of this kind of risk, given that
there were 7000 accidents in Durban in 2010 involving trucks, leaving more than
70 fatalities. In Clairwood alone, trucking companies invading the residential area
with illegally zoned truck yards, and accidents there and on nearby Bluff roads
had killed nine residents in the prior five years. The Clairwood community leader
who opposed trucks the most vigorously, Ahmed Osman, was assassinated in April
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2009, shot dead on his front porch in one of many unsolved crimes involving the
deaths of Durban activists (Bond 2011).
In spite of such dangers (D’Sa himself was a target of a nighttime firebombing
in his working-class flat in December 2007), the rhythm of street protest is also
revealing. As the municipality and Transnet began public consultations in 2012,
SDCEA activists were able to use the mass meetings as rallying points. For example,
in September 2012, Clairwood’s established Indian residents most immediately
threatened by the existing harbour’s expansion invited then Finance Minister Pravin
Gordhan – who thirty years earlier was a community organiser against apartheid
housing in those very streets – to make a presentation defending Transnet and the
city. He attempted to do so, using the standard neoliberal narrative of international
competition, and specifically the threat that Maputo would get ahead in port traffic
to Johannesburg (itself a reasonable proposition given that it is a shorter route
without the Durban-Johannesburg mountainous terrain to cross).Tellingly, however,
Gordhan also hinted that a divide-and-conquer strategy lay ahead against SDCEA
activists, because Clairwood is also a site of several thousand black African
shackdwellers barely surviving in informal settlements, backyard slums and even
large tents. Fires regularly ravage these residents’ shacks, destroying their
belongings and often injuring (and even occasionally killing) people, including
one night-time blaze that wrecked a double-yard settlement of 500 shacks in mid-
2013. The mainly middle-class audience of traditional homeowners of Indian ethnic
origin were reminded by Gordhan that the ANC’s ability to mobilise in a relatively
desegregated Clairwood could haunt a coming political showdown, in which those
with the most to lose were Indians in Clairwood and Merebank, followed by those
in the mainly Coloured area of Wentworth (which suffers the most pollution) and
the traditionally white Bluff area.
Still, three months later, in December 2012, several hundred people heeded
SDCEA’s call to block the back port entrance, leaving a three kilometer long queue
of trucks. Protests slowed in 2013 as the port EIA process and other high-profile
debates with Transnet and municipal politicians took priority. But by March 2014,
when SDCEA held a march to City Hall of 800 residents, new issues and
constituencies were added to the coalition, including farmers on the old airport
land who are to be displaced as the Dug-Out Port is built, and subsistence fisherfolk
whose access to the existing harbour was contested from the time of the 9/11
bombings – thus generating US paranoia over port security – until in 2013 they
were permitted back into their traditional fishing area. The challenge for connecting
dots and adding issue areas would arise in subsequent years, as the Umlazi
Unemployed People’s Movement (UPM) joined the anti-port coalition, for their
ambition is to have the old airport land turned into low-income housing and labour-
intensive industrial cooperatives. There is also potential for the country’s largest
trade union, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa), to
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concretise its ambitions of a United Front linking workers, residents,
environmentalists, women and youth. If Numsa succeeds in taking over the
organization and representation of Durban port workers – as they were doing down
the coast at the Coega container terminal – and evoking genuine eco-socialist
politics, if the UPM leads land invasions at the airport before the 2016 digging is
due to begin, and if Clairwood shackdwellers and nearby worker-hostel residents
in Umbilo and Jacobs are fully organized, then the threat of racial divisions would
fade.
However, it must be conceded, finally, that SDCEA remained weak when it
came to an alternative approach to the South Durban Basin’s development.As
SDCEA’s 2012 pamphlet reported, “We must urgently invest in a post-fossil fuel
development path including renewable technologies and resilience to climate
impacts. Are we giving up our land, environment and community to facilitate
imports feeding rampant consumerism?” That stark choice lay ahead not only for
SDCEA, South Durban residents and the broader city – but for the country and
world as a whole. With the capitalist “development model” representing by far the
greatest risk to the continuation of a decent life on a climate-constrained planet,
and with inequality and political degradation out of control in South Africa and
across the globe, then the showdown over South Durban’s future would, in
microcosm, signal whether disparate forces can find unity in opposition, and use
that unity to plan a future based on less risky ways of arranging economy, society
and nature.
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